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us in the same way that we view tigers. What we are
really talking about, presumably, is the subgroups which
humans have somewhat laboriously created from the
original strains of domesticated animals. Dogs and
horses, with their obvious gradations from St. Bernard
to Pekingese and from Shire to Welsh pony, are only
two cases in point. Many persons are surprised to
discover that sheep, goats, pigs, ducks, geese, and fowl
all exist in dozens of domesticated breeds, each one of
which has recognizable characteristics, and each one of
which typically has its own registry. Indeed, the creation
of such breeds can itself become a viable financial
enterprise; new registries for horses continually open
up; and various characteristics are sought after, refined,
and bred for, even when they first appear as only minor
variations on the theme of an already existing breed. 3
So, when we ask about the moral significance or
lack thereof of domesticated animals, we are inquiring,
to reiterate, not about the distinction between the
standing of an African elephant and a horse, but about
the distinction, if any, between the status of an African
elephant and a Shire horse. The crucial difference is,
of course, that the Shire horse cannot reproduce itself
in anything like its appropriate form without human
assistance, since it is not a type of horse which occurs
in nature. Were humans miraculously to vanish from
the face of the earth tomorrow (not via nuclear warfare,
since that, by hypothesis, would result in extreme

Questions about the rights of groups or kinds of
animals, and their moral standing, have traditionally
appeared in the literature as questions about species
occurring in nature. l As Passmore has it~ "Does it really
matter that the moa no longer stalks the New Zealand
plain?" In those few pieces where the status of
domesticated species is discussed, however indirectly,
the questions tend to center around commercial farming
and arguments for and against vegetarianism, rather than
the question of the status of domesticated vs. naturally
occurring species as an issue in itself. 2
In this paper I plan to address the question of the
moral significance, from the standpoint of animal
rights, of whether or not a species is domesticated. One
hesitates to employ the term "species" here, because it
turns out that what we are really talking about is not, in
most cases of domesticated animals, the species itself
but some subgrouping, usually created by humankind,
frequently termed a breed. In other words, the question
in its barest form is not whether horses or dogs have a
moral standing different from that, say of the Bengal
tiger. Horses and dogs existed before they were
domesticated, and had they not come into extensive
contact with people, would no doubt now be viewed by
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domesticated breeds are at least on a par with other
animals. All domesticated creatures are, after all, sentient,
just as the majority of non-domesticated creatures are,
with the possible exception, as Singer notes, of molluscs
and insects.6 Sentiency has widely been held to be the
basis of the ascription of rights, or for utilitarian theories,
the basis for the "taking into consideration" of animals
and their well-being. Secondly, although it may very
well be true that. given catastrophe and the absence of
humans from the planet, Shire horses would revert to
pre-Shire type, or even refuse to breed at all and die
out within one generation, all animals, non-domestic
and domestic, undergo subtle or not so subtle changes
in mutable characteristics over a period of time. Thus,
the reversion of most dogs to a mixed, indeterminate,
pre-breed type without human intervention is simply a
more dramatic illustration of the slower changes
undergone, say, by the lion, over a period of time.
In "Darwin, Species and Morality," Rachels points
out some respects in which differences between animals
may not be as helpful in elucidating their moral status
as one might have thought. What Rachels wants us to
remember is that differences and distinctions are
relevant only in specified contexts. Before developing
this line of thought with regard to questions concerning
animals, Rachels asks us to think in terms ofdifferences
between individual persons. Person Ahas higher grades
and test scores than person B, but that only justifies
giving A preferential treatment in situations that call
for analysis along the lines of grades and test scores
namely, ocademic situations. In another A-B duo, person
A may be suffering from an infection and B from a
broken arm, but that only justifies making distinctions
between them in a medical context'? Rachels goes on
to talk of the more standard sort of question in animal
rights, Le., whether or not I can justify my treatment of
a chimpanzee, for example, by its presumed lesser
capacity for rationaIity.8 But clearly, this type of
distinction is relevant to the question we are discussing.
The differences between domesticated and non
domesticated species are such that it is hard to see in
what sorts of morally relevant contexts they would be
applicable. The fact that a breed is ill-equipped for
survival without human intervention, or even the
happier fact that it contributed greatly to the develop
ment of human culture, does not immediately seem to
be a morally relevant difference (particularly when we
recall that the comparison here is between types of
animals, and not between animals and humans). The

environmental contamination) elephants would
continue indefinitely, but Shire horses would not.
Should we then be concerned about domesticated
strains of creatures? Given that we have any concern
at all for Passmore's moa, or for the ostrich, which is
still here, should we have a similar concern for the
Shire? I pick the Shire deliberately, since it is a breed
of draft horse, and draft horses are not needed by
humans in 1988 in the same way that they once were.
In the past thirty years or so, the Shire has several times
neared extinction, and has been rescued as a breed by a
combination of British and American efforts. 4 A great
deal of time and money has been spent on the Shire,
the Cleveland Bay, the Suffolk Punch, and even the
MorganS (although it appears that the Morgan, for one,
is long since home free); dog breeders are continually
hearing about the plight of, for example, the Bernese
Mountain Dog or the Redtick Hound.
On the face of it, it appears that domesticated breeds
or subvarieties of species differ from their undomes
ticated counterparts in two important ways. The first
and most obvious is that many breeds are ilI-equipped
for survival without human help. In some cases,
particularly with certain dog breeds, muscular and
skeletal changes through extensive and close inbreeding
have contributed to the make-up of an animal who
probably could not survive on its own. The dog's natural
defenses have been virtually bred out In oIher ~, tre
animal could survive, but only in the sense that a given
individual might be able to last out the course of its life
time. Many breeds of horses are notoriously "shy"
breeders (even outshying the Panda), and it is not clear
that they would be able to reproduce without human
intervention. The second major respect in which the
human-created breeds differ from naturally occurring
variations or species might be deemed to be a positive
difference. It is, after all, these very animals who have
contributed the most to the course of human history
and culture. When horse breeders remind us of the role
played by horses in the development of various human
cultures, they are, after all, not speaking of zebras or
Przewalski's horse. The horses they are ~g of were
bred and raised by humans, and many of these horses are
of the very same breeds now thought to be endangered.
On the other hand, one might want to note areas of
similarity between the domestic breeds and non
domestic animals. Here one wants to say almost imme
diately that insofar as the characteristics having to do
with putative moral significance are concerned,
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an exaggeration of traits which most dogs possess. One
hesitates to make this assertion flatfootedly, since the
counterargument that naturally occurring, untouched
species are members of the original primeval
environment ahd hence deserve special consideration
is strong, but it does not make sense to think that the
special qualities of domesticated animals make them
somehow less worth preserving that the moo, the Great
Auk, or the Indonesian subspecies of rhinoceros. In
this sense, I think Rachels' general point serves us well.
Finally, there seems to be a relationship between
these special characteristics possessed by many breeds
of domesticated animals and the aforementioned hoary
topic of sentiency, although the relationship may be
somewhat difficult to articulate. Some breeds,
particularly of dogs and horses, seem simply to be more
sensitive to physical stress and pain than other breeds,
and certainly than many non-domesticated animals.
Skin characteristics, shape and length ofcoat, sensitivity
to physical stimuli, and so forth, may have become so
altered in the course of refining the breed from the
original stock that it makes sense to say, in rough terms,
that the breed possesses more than average sensitivity
or sentiency. And one can certainly say-although the
cynical may see this as a topic for humor-that some
breeds seem to possess an emotional sensitivity as well.
Stereotypes about small dogs and Thoroughbred and
Arabian horses are widespread. Again, the inference
to be made from this information is that, if these
differences between domesticated breeds or strains and
non-domesticated types of animals are noted, it would
seem that these differences count in their favor, not
against them.
In the previous paragraphs I have alluded to the
occurrence of non-domesticated species in the pristine,
pre-human-intervention environment. This is a topic
ofsome importance and deserves a fuller treatment than
I have so far given it. A number of the commentators
on the general subject ofanimal rights seem to feel that
arguments for moral consideration of animals break
down, crudely, into three categories. Regan, in his
article "Ethical Vegetarianism and Commercial Animal
Farming," distinguishes between views which we might
roughly label utilitarian, deontological, and holistl
environmentalist. 1O Viewed cursorily, the utilitarian
position frequently asks us to take animals into
consideration morally because they are sentient, or
because mistreatment of animals might lead to
mistreatment of humans, so that it is human life which

fact that domesticated animals are also sentient and that
their reversion to type is only a speeded-up version of
general genetic change taking place in all living beings
may be morally relevant, but those facts serve only to
place domesticated animals more or less on a par with
non-domesticated animals.
I want now to note another important point, also
borrowed from Rachels' recent work, although with this
particular point I will have to construct an analogy.
Rachels' paper as a whole is concerned to argue for
what he terms "Moral Individualism," meaning that
we should regard animals, too, as individuals and not
as typical members of their respective groups. In an
interesting passage, Rachels notes that a hypothetical
gifted chimpanzee who had learned to read and speak
English might still be barred from the classroom by some
well-meaning persons who contend that, in general,
chimpanzees are not on a par with humans, and it is the
group standards which count As Rachels says, 'This chimp
is not permitted to do something which requires reading,
despite the fact that he can read, because other chimps
cannot. That seems not only unfair, but irrational. ,09
Now, we are not here concerned with Rachels' moral
individualism, although in general I find his argument
on that score convincing. But, constructing an analogy,
I think the following may be said: domesticated animals
differ from the non-domesticated in ways which are
analogous to the differences between a very gifted
chimpanzee and the average wild chimpanzee.
Domesticated, registered, purebred animals are
very-may we say?-gifted specimens of their general
species. They are in many instances specially trained,
but no training is necessary for many capacities, because
a large percentage of the traits are inborn. Most horses
cannot be taught to pace, for example, because it
involves a form of locomotion which a horse does not
naturally utilize. But registered Standardbred foals will
start pacing at one or two days of age. Therefore,
domesticated animals are not typical of their species,
and if this specific point is relevant to their moral
standing in any particular way, it probably speaks in
their favor, rather than against them.
One might be inclined to note that the traits which
these animals have are, of course, traits specifically
desired by humans, but again, one could move with
that assertion in either direction. Surely the fact that a
German short-haired pointer puppy may begin sponta
IlneouSlY to point at an early age does not count against
the value of pointers as such, since pointing is merely
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domesticated animals, and, interestingly enough, he
does not think that animal rights arguments themselves
are very helpful to the preservationist. Passmore ends
his article by writing of a "shift in sensibility," and he
continues to write of the need fa valuing the environment
as a whole. 14 John Rodman, in "The Liberation of
Nature," takes a preservationist stance even more
foreign to animal rights than Passmore's. Rodman
seems to think that the animal rights arguments are
positively harmful, because they send a "double
message." It is the second half of the double message,
so to speak, which particularly concerns Rodman; he
writes that "...non-humans are by the same process
degraded to the status of inferior human beings, species
anomalies: imbeciles, the senile, 'human vegetables'
moral half-breeds having rights without obligations
(Singer), 'legal incompetents' needing humans to
interpret and represent their interests in a perpetual
guardian/ward relationship (Stone)."15 In general,
Rodman is against the notion ofanimal rights and argues
strenuously for the development of a new attitude
toward the natural world. He is also, in general, against
the enterprise of domestication itself.
From the foregoing it is possible to glean the
following: concern for domesticated species or breeds
will have to come from within the animal rights move
ment It does not appear to have a natural home within
the thought of those who take the holistlenvironmentalist
position with regard to humans and the environment
Problematically, even within the animal rights move
ment, it seems difficult to separate a concern for
domesticated species from a concern for humans. As
noted earlier, Regan's work lends itselfmost naturally to a
concern for domesticated species, since so much of his
material focuses on commercial animal fanning. But
the difficulty here is that we are not, presumably,
addressing the same issue. I may wholeheartedly agree
that the treatment of the Rhode Island Reds used for
egg-laying and meat consumption purposes is
inhumane, and I may even become a vegetarian. But
this is not the same thing as evincing a concern for the
preservation of the Rhode Island Red as a breed, in
comparison, say, to the Leghorn, or even, again, to the
original, non-domesticated Southeast Asia fowl from
which our domesticated fowl sprang. I may be against
the consumption of horsemeat in France, the use of
horsemeat for commercial animal-food purposes here
in the U.S., against the preparation of American Saddle
breds for certain shows by using bellboots, and even

is primarily valued here. A more straightforward
deontological approach grants animals rights, but then
the difficulty, as McCloskey has argued, revolves
around demarcating the line between right-holding
living things and non-right-holding living things and
adjudicating disputes, as it were, between animals
themselves. II Finally, one can give up on the debate
between the consequentialists and the deontologists and
simply make the argument that our environment, taken
as a whole, is worth preserving. Now, when one does
this, one runs into the sorts of conundra which have
been parodied by some-the legal standing of trees,
and so forth. But more salient for our purposes, one is
back to square one in the contretemps over special
standing ofdomesticated animals, because domesticated
animals are paradigm cases of living entities which did
not naturally occur as part of the environment.
Unfortunately for the case ofdomesticated animals,
it probably can be asserted that if one's interest in
animals stems largely or entirely from an interest in the
environment as a whole-that is, if one is not much
more concerned about the California condor than about
the giant sequoia or even the Grand Canyon-one will
have comparatively little or no interest in domesticated
animals. Those preservationally-minded philosophers,
like Passmore and Rodman,12 who have written on the
need for new attitudes regarding the Earth and the living
beings on it have either not dealt with domesticated
species at all or have written about animals in a way
that indicates that domesticated species might be given
short shrift. Passmore, for example, begins his article
"Preservation" with the following passage:
By 'preservation' I mean the attempt to main
tain in their present condition such areas of the
earth's surface as do not yet bear the obvious
marks of man's handiwork and to protect from
the risk of extinction those species of living
beings which man has not yet destroyed. 13
Passmore goes on to write of the need for preser
vation due to the intrinsic need of humans for solitude,
the various sorts of interpretations of the notion of
preservation which might be given by, say, casual
campers and vacationers vs. Sierra Club backpackers,
and the varying criteria for the usefulness of animal
species in general. Toward the end of his piece
Passmore discusses in some detail animal rights
arguments, but only insofar as they concern non-
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human culture. Then, perhaps the strongest counter
argument to those who insiston theholist/environmen
talist view to the detriment of domesticated animals is
that domesticated animals are part of our world, the
human world, and by extension, worth preserving.

against two-year racing of Thoroughbreds, but none of
these of those positions amounts to a concern over the
preservation of the American Saddlebred breed as such.
Thus, I think it is clear that within the framework of
what has been done so far by philosophers on animal
rights, only the position which accords animals actual
rights in the sense that humans have rights (this is the
position McCloskey, for one, attempts to refute) is at
all helpful in the delineation of the status of domes
ticated species vs. non-domesticated species. Insofar
as that position may be countered-and some of the
arguments against it are fairly strong 16-there is a
difficulty for both domesticated and non-domesticated
species, for any account of the rights of domesticated
species or breeds would have to rest on their
resemblance to non-domesticated species, as I argued
at an earlier point Insofar as there might be an argument
for animal rights which would make characteristics not
possessed by domesticated animals salient (for example,
capacity to survive genetically without human
intervention), it would not be able to encompass rights
for domesticated animals. Happily, however, I know
of no views of animal rights which are so stringently
drawn that they would leave out domesticated animals.
Indeed, some views, like Rachels' "moral individualism,"
which I mentioned earlier, do not take into account
group status at all, and this would have the felicitous
consequence for domesticated animals of rendering
differences between them and non-domesticated species
irrelevant from the moral point of view.
In sum I have argued that if we can accept a view
of animal rights for non-domesticaled species, there are
probably no strong reasons for denying the rights to
domesticated species, both when seen from the
standpoint of the individual creatures involved and
when seen from the (more interesting, I believe)
standpoint of breeds vs. species. Nevertheless, there
remains in the literature a strong strain that what is most
valuable about the planet and what is most worth
preserving is what is least touched by humans. The
inevitable upshot of the ubiquitousness of this view is
that many who would be concerned about the
Indonesian rhinoceros will not be nearly as concerned
about the Shire. But the question remains, of course,
whether we are concerned about ourselves. The planet
as a whole might very well be better off wi thout humans,
were there some way to remove humans from the planet
without destroying the environment. But we are
humans, not beings from another world, and we value
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